Vulnerability detection is the process of identifying security vulnerabilities in software applications or systems.
In this paper, we address the challenging problem of single-scene, fully unsupervised video anomaly detection (VAD), where raw videos containing both normal and abnormal events are used directly for training and testing without any labels. This differs sharply from prior work that either requires extensive labeling (fully or weakly supervised) or depends on normal-only videos (one-class classification), which are vulnerable to distribution shifts and contamination. We propose an entropy-guided autoencoder that detects anomalies through reconstruction error by reconstructing normal frames well while making anomalies reconstruct poorly. The key idea is to combine the standard reconstruction loss with a novel Minimal Latent Entropy (MLE) loss in the autoencoder. Reconstruction loss alone maps normal and abnormal inputs to distinct latent clusters due to their inherent differences, but also risks reconstructing anomalies too well to detect. Therefore, MLE loss addresses this by minimizing the entropy of latent embeddings, encouraging them to concentrate around high-density regions. Since normal frames dominate the raw video, sparse anomalous embeddings are pulled into the normal cluster, so the decoder emphasizes normal patterns and produces poor reconstructions for anomalies. This dual-loss design produces a clear reconstruction gap that enables effective anomaly detection. Extensive experiments on two widely used benchmarks and a challenging self-collected driving dataset demonstrate that our method achieves robust and superior performance over baselines.
What should a developer inspect before deploying an LLM agent: the model, the tool code, the deployment configuration, or all three? In practice, many security failures in agent systems arise not from model weights alone, but from the surrounding software stack: tool functions that pass untrusted inputs to dangerous operations, exposed credentials in deployment artifacts, and over-privileged Model Context Protocol (MCP) configurations. We present Agent Audit, a security analysis system for LLM agent applications. Agent Audit analyzes Python agent code and deployment artifacts through an agent-aware pipeline that combines dataflow analysis, credential detection, structured configuration parsing, and privilege-risk checks. The system reports findings in terminal, JSON, and SARIF formats, enabling direct integration with local development workflows and CI/CD pipelines. On a benchmark of 22 samples with 42 annotated vulnerabilities, Agent Audit detects 40 vulnerabilities with 6 false positives, substantially improving recall over common SAST baselines while maintaining sub-second scan times. Agent Audit is open source and installable via pip, making security auditing accessible for agent systems. In the live demonstration, attendees scan vulnerable agent repositories and observe how Agent Audit identifies security risks in tool functions, prompts, and more. Findings are linked to source locations and configuration paths, and can be exported into VS Code and GitHub Code Scanning for interactive inspection.
Deep learning models for time series imputation are now essential in fields such as healthcare, the Internet of Things (IoT), and finance. However, their deployment raises critical privacy concerns. Beyond the well-known issue of unintended memorization, which has been extensively studied in generative models, we demonstrate that time series models are vulnerable to inference attacks in a black-box setting. In this work, we introduce a two-stage attack framework comprising: (1) a novel membership inference attack based on a reference model that improves detection accuracy, even for models robust to overfitting-based attacks, and (2) the first attribute inference attack that predicts sensitive characteristics of the training data for timeseries imputation model. We evaluate these attacks on attention-based and autoencoder architectures in two scenarios: models that are trained from scratch, and fine-tuned models where the adversary has access to the initial weights. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed membership attack retrieves a significant portion of the training data with a tpr@top25% score significantly higher than a naive attack baseline. We show that our membership attack also provides a good insight of whether attribute inference will work (with a precision of 90% instead of 78% in the genral case).
The integration of machine learning (ML) algorithms into Internet of Things (IoT) applications has introduced significant advantages alongside vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, especially within IoT-based intrusion detection systems (IDS). While theoretical adversarial attacks have been extensively studied, practical implementation constraints have often been overlooked. This research addresses this gap by evaluating the feasibility of evasion attacks on IoT network-based IDSs, employing a novel black-box adversarial attack. Our study aims to bridge theoretical vulnerabilities with real-world applicability, enhancing understanding and defense against sophisticated threats in modern IoT ecosystems. Additionally, we propose a defense scheme tailored to mitigate the impact of evasion attacks, thereby reinforcing the resilience of ML-based IDSs. Our findings demonstrate successful evasion attacks against IDSs, underscoring their susceptibility to advanced techniques. In contrast, we proposed a defense mechanism that exhibits robust performance by effectively detecting the majority of adversarial traffic, showcasing promising outcomes compared to current state-of-the-art defenses. By addressing these critical cybersecurity challenges, our research contributes to advancing IoT security and provides insights for developing more resilient IDS.
As the modern microservice architecture for cloud applications grows in popularity, cloud services are becoming increasingly complex and more vulnerable to misconfiguration and software bugs. Traditional approaches rely on expert input to diagnose and fix microservice anomalies, which lacks scalability in the face of the continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) paradigm. Microservice rollouts, containing new software installations, have complex interactions with the components of an application. Consequently, this added difficulty in attributing anomalous behavior to any specific installation or rollout results in potentially slower resolution times. To address the gaps in current diagnostic methods, this paper introduces Praxium, a framework for anomaly detection and root cause inference. Praxium aids administrators in evaluating target metric performance in the context of dependency installation information provided by a software discovery tool, PraxiPaaS. Praxium continuously monitors telemetry data to identify anomalies, then conducts root cause analysis via causal impact on recent software installations, in order to provide site reliability engineers (SRE) relevant information about an observed anomaly. In this paper, we demonstrate that Praxium is capable of effective anomaly detection and root cause inference, and we provide an analysis on effective anomaly detection hyperparameter tuning as needed in a practical setting. Across 75 total trials using four synthetic anomalies, anomaly detection consistently performs at >0.97 macro-F1. In addition, we show that causal impact analysis reliably infers the correct root cause of anomalies, even as package installations occur at increasingly shorter intervals.
Multi-modal fusion has emerged as a promising paradigm for accurate 3D object detection. However, performance degrades substantially when deployed in target domains different from training. In this work, focusing on dual-branch proposal-level detectors, we identify two factors that limit robust cross-domain generalization: 1) in challenging domains such as rain or nighttime, one modality may undergo severe degradation; 2) the LiDAR branch often dominates the detection process, leading to systematic underutilization of visual cues and vulnerability when point clouds are compromised. To address these challenges, we propose three components. First, Query-Decoupled Loss provides independent supervision for 2D-only, 3D-only, and fused queries, rebalancing gradient flow across modalities. Second, LiDAR-Guided Depth Prior augments 2D queries with instance-aware geometric priors through probabilistic fusion of image-predicted and LiDAR-derived depth distributions, improving their spatial initialization. Third, Complementary Cross-Modal Masking applies complementary spatial masks to the image and point cloud, encouraging queries from both modalities to compete within the fused decoder and thereby promoting adaptive fusion. Extensive experiments demonstrate substantial gains over state-of-the-art baselines while preserving source-domain performance. Code and models are publicly available at https://github.com/IMPL-Lab/CCF.
OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) \textbf{Skill-based protection} operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) \textbf{Plugin-based protection} serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) \textbf{Watcher-based protection} introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.
Large language models (LLMs) can be misused to reveal sensitive information, such as weapon-making instructions or writing malware. LLM providers rely on $\emph{monitoring}$ to detect and flag unsafe behavior during inference. An open security challenge is $\emph{adaptive}$ adversaries who craft attacks that simultaneously (i) evade detection while (ii) eliciting unsafe behavior. Adaptive attackers are a major concern as LLM providers cannot patch their security mechanisms, since they are unaware of how their models are being misused. We cast $\emph{robust}$ LLM monitoring as a security game, where adversaries who know about the monitor try to extract sensitive information, while a provider must accurately detect these adversarial queries at low false positive rates. Our work (i) shows that existing LLM monitors are vulnerable to adaptive attackers and (ii) designs improved defenses through $\emph{activation watermarking}$ by carefully introducing uncertainty for the attacker during inference. We find that $\emph{activation watermarking}$ outperforms guard baselines by up to $52\%$ under adaptive attackers who know the monitoring algorithm but not the secret key.
Federated Learning (FL), as a popular distributed learning paradigm, has shown outstanding performance in improving computational efficiency and protecting data privacy, and is widely applied in industrial image classification. However, due to its distributed nature, FL is vulnerable to threats from malicious clients, with poisoning attacks being a common threat. A major limitation of existing poisoning attack methods is their difficulty in bypassing model performance tests and defense mechanisms based on model anomaly detection. This often results in the detection and removal of poisoned models, which undermines their practical utility. To ensure both the performance of industrial image classification and attacks, we propose a targeted poisoning attack, PoiCGAN, based on feature-label collaborative perturbation. Our method modifies the inputs of the discriminator and generator in the Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (CGAN) to influence the training process, generating an ideal poison generator. This generator not only produces specific poisoned samples but also automatically performs label flipping. Experiments across various datasets show that our method achieves an attack success rate 83.97% higher than baseline methods, with a less than 8.87% reduction in the main task's accuracy. Moreover, the poisoned samples and malicious models exhibit high stealthiness.
The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in education raises profound challenges for assessment design. To adapt assessments to the presence of LLM-based tools, it is crucial to characterize the strengths and weaknesses of LLMs in a generalizable, valid and reliable manner. However, current LLM evaluations often rely on descriptive statistics derived from benchmarks, and little research applies theory-grounded measurement methods to characterize LLM capabilities relative to human learners in ways that directly support assessment design. Here, by combining educational data mining and psychometric theory, we introduce a statistically principled approach for identifying items on which humans and LLMs show systematic response differences, pinpointing where assessments may be most vulnerable to AI misuse, and which task dimensions make problems particularly easy or difficult for generative AI. The method is based on Differential Item Functioning (DIF) analysis -- traditionally used to detect bias across demographic groups -- together with negative control analysis and item-total correlation discrimination analysis. It is evaluated on responses from human learners and six leading chatbots (ChatGPT-4o \& 5.2, Gemini 1.5 \& 3 Pro, Claude 3.5 \& 4.5 Sonnet) to two instruments: a high school chemistry diagnostic test and a university entrance exam. Subject-matter experts then analyzed DIF-flagged items to characterize task dimensions associated with chatbot over- or under-performance. Results show that DIF-informed analytics provide a robust framework for understanding where LLM and human capabilities diverge, and highlight their value for improving the design of valid, reliable, and fair assessment in the AI era.